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1. Introduction 
We investigate the impact of different accounting 
principles and of a change of accounting principles 
on financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
Our results provide evidence that forecast accuracy 
is higher for estimates based on data prepared un-
der internationally accepted accounting principles 
(IAAP), i.e. International Accounting Standards 
(IAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)1 or United States Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (US GAAP), than for estimates 
based on German GAAP (also called “Handelsge-
setzbuch (HGB)”) data. Moreover, in years of the 
adoption of new accounting principles the forecast 
accuracy is lower than in other years for companies 
switching from HGB to US GAAP. Germany pro-
vides a unique framework for these analyses for two 
                                                             
1 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
were initially called International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
In 2001, they changed name to International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS). We use the term “IAS” when we 
refer to periods before 2001, a combination of both terms 
(“IAS/IFRS”), when we refer to a time period including years 
before 2001 and the term “IFRS” when we refer to more recent 
periods. 
reasons: First, many publicly traded German com-
panies have successively switched to internationally 
accepted accounting principles (IAAP), i.e. IAS/ 
IFRS or US GAAP, before 2005. Therefore, the 
impact of the adoption of new accounting principles 
could be examined while controlling for macroeco-
nomic and other variables which are subject to 
change over time. Second, the national German 
GAAP is significantly different to IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP which makes the impact of the accounting 
principles on the analysts’ accuracy more obvious. 
The motivation for this study is the adoption proc-
ess of IFRS in Europe. Since 2005 almost all pub-
licly traded European companies have been re-
quired by the IAS regulation (1606/2002/EC) to 
prepare consolidated accounts under IFRS.2 For this 
transition process we try to make some inferences 
from the adoption process in Germany where many 
                                                             
2 Companies, which are publicly traded both in the European 
Union and on a regulated third-country market and which are 
therefore applying other IAAP (especially US GAAP) in their 
consolidated accounts, are allowed to defer the application of 
IFRS until 2007. This also holds for companies which only 
have publicly traded debt securities. 
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companies switched to IAS/IFRS or US GAAP be-
fore 2005. 
Many studies have analyzed the accuracy of ana-
lysts’ forecasts and its determinants. Most of the 
prior research has been conducted for the US (e.g. 
Lys and Soo 1995; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 
1997; Alford and Berger 1999; Clement 1999; Jacob, 
Lys, and Neale 1999; Duru and Reeb 2002; Irvine 
2004; Gu and Wang 2005; Lin and Yang 2006) or 
the UK (e.g. Acker, Horton, and Tonks 2002). We 
analyze the German market similar to Capstaff, 
Paudyal, and Rees (1998), Wallmeier (2005), Daske 
(2005), and Bessler and Stanzel (2007). However, 
only the study by Daske (2005) examining the pe-
riod 1993–2002 explicitly controls for the type of 
accounting principles applied. Similarly, our study 
considers the impact of differences in the account-
ing regimes applied, but also delivers evidence on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy for a more recent time 
period, i.e. the years 1998–2004. 
Our study contributes to prior research as it consid-
ers accounting principles and accounting principle 
changes as control variables. Thus, we are able to 
document in contrast to Daske (2005) that the im-
plication of an international accounting regime 
(IAS/IFRS and US GAAP) is associated with a 
higher forecast accuracy of financial analysts. Since 
1998 German companies have been allowed by law 
to choose to prepare their consolidated accounts in 
accordance with national GAAP, IAS/IFRS, or US 
GAAP. Therefore, Germany provides a unique 
framework for a comparative analysis within a ho-
mogeneous institutional background. This allows us 
to effectively control for institutional factors (e.g. 
regulatory requirements and the enforcement sys-
tem) which prove to be important determinants of 
analysts’ forecast quality (Hope 2003a; Hope 
2003b; Hope 2004; Barniv, Myring, and Thomas 
2005). 
Our paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 gives an 
overview of related previous studies. Section 3 states 
the research hypotheses. Section 4 explains the 
variables and models used in the analyses. Section 5 
gives an overview of the sample selection process 
and of the data sources. Sections 6 and 7 present 
and discuss the descriptive and regression results. 
Section 8 provides the results of sensitivity analyses 
and Section 9 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Drivers of analyst forecast accuracy 
In the last few years, there has been an explosion of 
research examining analyst forecasts. One can iden-
tify interacting analyst-specific and firm-specific 
factors that drive analyst accuracy (see Figure 1). 
Concerning the individual analyst, it is known 
amongst other things that he or she tends to be 
rather optimistic in the way that his or her forecasts 
are systematically upward biased (e.g. Easterwood 
and Nutt 1999) and are revised rather gradually (e.g. 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002). In addition, ana-
lysts certainly may exhibit different skills which may 
emanate from their experience, workload, or risk 
tolerance. On the other side, a firm’s characteristics 
also drive analyst forecast accuracy, e.g. company 
size, industry or country the company operates in, 
or its regulatory environment (e.g. Das and Sauda-
garan 1998; Higgins 1998). Furthermore, manage-
ment actions may influence forecast accuracy di-
rectly or indirectly. On the one hand, several studies 
indicate the management of earnings and the guid-
ance of forecasts towards the consensus (Bannister 
and Newman 1996; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeck-
hauser 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Bartov, Givoly, and 
Hayn 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Hutton 
2005; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; for Germany 
see Bessler and Stanzel 2007). On the other hand, 
through issuing its own forecasts, management tries 
to influence analysts’ expectations (e.g. Williams 
1996; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Lennox and Park 
2006). Thus, both the management of earnings and 
expectations jointly drive the analysts’ consensus 
gradually down to beatable analyst forecasts, which 
may favor equity issuances or insider trading (e.g. 
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004). 
Figure 1: Drivers of analyst forecast 
accuracy 
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2.2 Analyst forecast accuracy and 
accounting data 
This study deals with the actions of management 
that relate to the firm’s accounting practices and 
disclosure policy. Our work combines two strands of 
research: studies on the impact of accounting data 
and studies on the impact of the adoption of IAAP.  
Financial analysts are frequently regarded as so-
phisticated processors of financial information and 
often taken as representatives of the market  
(Revsine, Collins, and Johnson 2001). Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that financial statements are an 
important source of information for analysts when 
determining their forecasts (Acker, Horton, and 
Tonks 2002; Peek 2005).  
The influences of (changes in) accounting standards 
and disclosures on the forecast accuracy have been 
widely examined. For example, Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) show that a disclosure score for US compa-
nies in the period 1985–1989 is positively associated 
with the number of analysts following (i.e. coverage) 
as well as forecast accuracy, and is negatively asso-
ciated with forecast dispersion as well as variability 
of forecast revisions. However, the category of in-
vestor relations, in particular, shows significant 
relationships, whereas annual financial statements 
as well as other annual published information are 
mostly not significant. The findings of Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) are confirmed in an international 
study by Hope (2003a). Analyzing 1,309 firm-year 
observations from 22 countries he observes that 
companies’ disclosure levels (as well as the level of 
enforcement) are positively associated with the 
forecast accuracy of analysts. Several other studies 
examine the association between both the level of 
and an increase in the quality of disclosures with 
forecast errors (Higgins 1998; Chang, Khanna, and 
Palepu 2000; Ang and Ciccone 2001; Acker, Hor-
ton, and Tonks 2002; Hope 2003b; Vanstraelen, 
Zarzeski, and Robb 2003; Hope 2004) and find 
similar results for various countries. 
In particular the predictive value of disclosures 
seems to have a positive impact on properties of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. For example, the in-
formation provided in segment reports which aims 
at helping users of financial statements to evaluate 
the present and future performance of a company is 
found to enhance analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(Baldwin 1984; Swaminathan 1991; Hussain 1998; 
Lobo, Kwon, and Ndubizu 1998; Behn, Nichols, and 
Street 2002). Similarly, Barron, Kile, and O’Keefe 
(1999) document a positive association between 
forecast accuracy and the quality of disclosures in 
the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
and especially certain forward-looking information 
in the MD&A. 
Besides disclosures, specific properties of account-
ing standards and their impact on forecast accuracy 
have been examined. In a cross-country study Basu, 
Hwang, and Jan (1998) find that forecast accuracy 
is lower in countries with accounting regimes hav-
ing the following properties: higher relative use of 
current value accounting (with revaluations passing 
through the income statement), less relative use of 
accruals, and less choice between accounting meth-
ods. However, for a sample of 18 countries Hope 
(2004) finds contrary results. Controlling for varia-
tions in the enforcement system between different 
countries and for variations in disclosure levels 
between different firms, he shows that the relative 
extent of choice is negatively associated and the 
relative extent of accrual accounting is positively 
associated with forecast accuracy. The impact of 
conservatism on the forecast accuracy of financial 
analysts is investigated by Mensah, Song, and Ho 
(2004). They analyzed three measures of conserva-
tism and find that a higher level of conservatism 
leads to higher forecast errors of financial analysts. 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) compare different 
accounting principles with reference to the forecast 
accuracy of financial analysts and set IAS as a 
benchmark. For a cross-country sample of 80 com-
panies having adopted IAS between 1990 and 1993, 
they show that analysts’ forecast errors are posi-
tively related to the differences between various 
domestic GAAP and IAS. Moreover, they find that 
forecast accuracy improves after the adoption of 
IAS. Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) investigated the 
determinants and consequences of applying IAAP 
for 114 companies from 12 European countries (in-
cluding Germany) in 1999. They show that IAAP 
application has a positive impact on analysts follow-
ing. However, they also document an increased 
analyst forecast dispersion effect for companies 
applying IAAP. A similar study was conducted by 
Daske (2005) for the period between 1993 and 2002 
in Germany. He finds a lower accuracy and higher 
dispersion, but no significant difference in the vola-
tility of analysts’ earnings forecasts based on 
IAS/IFRS or US GAAP in comparison to those 
based on German GAAP. However, in contrast to 
our study, he does not control for the complexity of 
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the forecasting task measured by the beta of a com-
pany as we do. He also provides evidence that the 
level of differences between earnings under 
IAS/IFRS or US GAAP and under German GAAP as 
well as the level of guidance provided by companies 
concerning the transition process has impacts on 
the forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion in the 
period of switching to another accounting regime. 
Reasons for these results being different to ours 
might be the different time period investigated and 
the different methodology. 
Other studies examine the effect of changes of ac-
counting methods on forecast accuracy. For the US, 
Brown, Richardson, and Schwager (1987) find only 
a slight impact on forecast accuracy for accounting 
changes in 1976. The impact is smaller when addi-
tional disclosures, like pro-forma adjustments, are 
provided. Elliott and Philbrick (1990) investigated 
accounting changes between 1976 and 1984. Their 
results suggest that the forecast accuracy turns out 
to be lower in years when accounting changes occur 
without prior disclosures. The findings are con-
firmed for the Netherlands by Peek (2005). The 
forecast accuracy is lower after changes in account-
ing procedures affecting earnings before extraordi-
nary items. These change effects depend on the 
disclosures prior to the change and the type of 
change. 
The impact of the adoption of IAS/IFRS has been 
analyzed by several studies using different perspec-
tives and different methods. In a cross-country 
study including Germany, Barth, Landsman, and 
Lang (2007) document a slight decrease in the cost 
of capital after the adoption of IAS/IFRS and a 
higher accounting quality of IAS/IFRS in compari-
son to domestic GAAP, concerning several measures 
such as timely loss recognition or value relevance. 
Other studies use reconciliations of net income 
and/or shareholders’ equity to evaluate differences 
between the IAS/IFRS and other accounting princi-
ples and the impacts of these differences (e.g. Harris 
and Muller 1999; Beckman, Brandes, and Eierle 
2007). Most studies assess the impact of the adop-
tion of IAS/IFRS in a single country. Studies have 
been conducted, e.g. for Switzerland (Auer 1999), 
Finland (Kinnunen, Niskanen, and Kasanen 2000), 
and Kuwait (El Shamy and Al-Qenae 2005). 
2.3 Impacts of the adoption of IAAP 
Most studies on the impact of an adoption of 
IAS/IFRS focus on Germany. One part of the stud-
ies about Germany examines the capital market 
impacts of the IAS/IFRS adoption, the other part 
the accounting or disclosure quality of the IAS/IFRS 
in comparison to German GAAP. Concerning the 
capital market impacts, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
as well as Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) document 
lower information asymmetry, but no decrease in 
volatility after the adoption of IAS/IFRS. Compar-
ing IAS and US GAAP adopters in Germany, Leuz 
(2003) shows that there seems to be no significant 
difference in terms of information asymmetry 
measured by bid-ask spreads and share turnover. 
Finally, Daske (2006) was not able to document 
that the expected cost of equity capital has de-
creased after the adoption of IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP. 
Concerning the accounting or disclosure quality, 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) find only little 
evidence for a higher value relevance of IAS in com-
parison to German GAAP for a sample of 80 com-
panies that adopted IAS between 1998 and 2002. 
Moreover, they provide evidence that German 
GAAP is more conservative and less fair-value ori-
entated than IAS. Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) 
document a higher value relevance for positive earn-
ings based on IAS and US GAAP than for those 
based on German GAAP. However, no difference is 
found either between the three accounting regimes 
for negative earnings or between IAS and US GAAP 
based earnings. In addition, Gassen and Sellhorn 
(2006) show that companies applying IAS/IFRS 
have more persistent, less predictable and more 
conditional conservative earnings than companies 
applying German GAAP. Focusing especially on 
disclosures, Daske and Gebhardt (2006) provide 
evidence that disclosure quality has increased after 
the adoption of IAS/IFRS or US GAAP by German 
companies. 
As the review of the existing literature reveals, there 
is still no recent large-scale study on the comparison 
between IAS/IFRS and domestic GAAP which ex-
amines their impact on the analysts’ forecast accu-
racy within the same institutional setting. The goal 
of this study is to fill this research gap and to pro-
vide insights into the impacts of the different prop-
erties of IAS/IFRS, US GAAP, and German GAAP 
on forecast accuracy in Germany. As Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001) argue, higher forecast 
accuracy could be associated with higher accounting 
quality and with lower implied cost of capital. 
Therefore, the research method used is related to 
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both the accounting quality of IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP and the capital market impact of the adoption 
of these accounting regimes. However, it has to be 
noted that high analyst forecast accuracy does not 
necessarily imply high accounting quality, because 
analysts’ forecast accuracy is a complex attribute 
which is – as indicated above – shaped by a set of 
potentially competing incentives and by the institu-
tional environment. 
3. Hypotheses 
In this study, we focus on the question of how ana-
lysts cope with the adoption of IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. Thereby, we are interested in the short-term 
effects a change of the accounting principles and in 
the long-term implications of the adoption of more 
investor-oriented accounting principles in a country 
with traditionally rather stakeholder-oriented ac-
counting principles. 
The first hypothesis of our study concerns the fore-
cast accuracy of financial analysts for earnings per 
share based on the different accounting regimes. 
The increase in the quantity and quality of disclo-
sures after the adoption of IAS/IFRS or US GAAP 
(Daske and Gebhardt 2006) should c.p. lead to a 
higher forecast accuracy as studies on the influence 
of disclosures on forecast accuracy suggest (Lang 
and Lundholm 1996; Higgins 1998; Chang, Khanna, 
and Palepu 2000; Ang and Ciccone 2001; Acker, 
Horton, and Tonks 2002; Hope 2003a; Hope 
2003b; Hope 2004). On the other hand, based on 
the results by Mensah, Song, and Ho (2004) the 
more conditional conservative earnings of IAS/IFRS 
vis-à-vis German GAAP found by Gassen and Sell-
horn (2006) should c.p. decrease forecast accuracy 
for companies switching from German GAAP to 
IAS/IFRS. 
Moreover, German GAAP is less fair value-oriented 
than US GAAP and IAS/IFRS. For example, Ger-
man GAAP does not allow upward revaluations of 
certain types of financial assets at fair value in con-
trast to US GAAP and IAS/IFRS. According to 
IAS/IFRS even property, plant, and equipment and 
investment property can be measured at fair value 
(IAS16.31).3 The higher fair value-orientation of 
IAS/IFRS in comparison to German GAAP is em-
pirically validated by Hung and Subramanyam 
                                                             
3 For a complete list of the use of fair value in IFRS see Cairns 
(2006). 
(2007). Peek (2005) argues and shows empirically 
that a higher fair value-orientation decreases fore-
cast accuracy, because earnings under historical cost 
accounting are more reliable and verifiable (e.g. Ijiri 
and Noel 1984; Knutson 1992) and less volatile than 
under current cost accounting. However, it has to be 
considered that according to IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP only a part of the fair value changes, e.g. from 
trading financial assets, has an impact on net in-
come. The other part of changes can (e.g. revalua-
tions of property, plant, and equipment according to 
IAS/IFRS as well as revaluations of available-for-
sale financial assets according to IAS/IFRS until 
2003), or must (e.g. revaluations of available-for-
sale financial assets according to US GAAP and 
according to IFRS since 2004) be recognized di-
rectly in equity. Therefore, the fair value-orientation 
could provide forward-looking information to finan-
cial analysts without influencing reported and fore-
casted earnings measures. 
Furthermore, the lower level of accrual accounting 
in German GAAP compared to US GAAP (Nobes 
and Parker 1998; Basu, Hwang, and Jan 1998; Hope 
2004) or IAS/IFRS supposedly influences forecast 
accuracy. Capitalization and amortization provides 
useful information about future profitability and, 
therefore, should improve forecast accuracy (Peek 
2005). This would c.p. imply a higher forecast accu-
racy for financial statements based on IAAP. How-
ever, a higher level of accrual accounting provides 
possibilities of earnings management which might 
have a detrimental effect on the forecast accuracy. 
The volatility of earnings is another important factor 
in explaining the forecast accuracy of financial ana-
lysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Peek 2005).  
Estimating earnings with a higher volatility might 
not allow incorporating simple models to extrapo-
late previous earnings trends. Thus, a higher volatil-
ity of earnings is likely to result in lower predictabil-
ity of earnings which leads to a lower forecast accu-
racy and a higher forecast bias of financial analysts 
(e.g., Lys and Soo 1995; Das, Levine, and Sivarama-
krishnan 1998). As the higher fair value-orientation 
of IAS/IFRS and US GAAP in comparison to Ger-
man GAAP might lead to a higher volatility of earn-
ings, c.p. a lower forecast accuracy could be ex-
pected for companies applying IAAP. 
Finally, the lower extent of choices in US GAAP than 
in IAS/IFRS or German GAAP (Nobes and Parker 
1998) could influence forecast accuracy. First, more 
choices and less discretion could be aligned with 
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higher forecast accuracy, because it may improve 
the ability of companies to manage earnings to-
wards the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Several stud-
ies indicate such earnings management behavior 
(Bannister and Newman 1996; Degeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003). 
In contrast, choices increase complexity and uncer-
tainty of analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) and 
therefore impair forecast accuracy (Hope 2004). 
Furthermore, earnings management may have ob-
jectives other than meeting analysts’ earnings fore-
casts, e.g. to report a non-negative result (Hayn 
1995), to increase share price before a stock transac-
tion (Dechow, Sloan, and Hutton 1996; Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong 1998), or to meet contractual 
provisions, such as in short-term bonus contracts 
that are tied to accounting measures (Holthausen, 
Larcker, and Sloan 1995). These objectives might 
worsen the predictability of earnings for analysts as 
they are usually not known by company outsiders. 
Empirically, the degree of earnings management 
seems to be largely the same across accounting 
principles in Germany (Van Tendeloo and Van-
straelen 2005; Goncharov 2005). Thus, the extent 
of choices of different accounting principles should 
not have a significant impact on the forecast accu-
racy across accounting principles in Germany. 
In summary, the effect of applying different ac-
counting regimes on the forecast accuracy of finan-
cial analysts is not obvious. After the adoption of 
IAS/IFRS or US GAAP the analysts should receive 
more (externally verified) information about the 
company’s financial position which enables them to 
build their prediction on a larger information set. 
Similarly, more informative accounting methods are 
likely to enhance analysts’ forecast accuracy without 
seriously biasing the net income to be forecasted. 
Therefore, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Forecast accuracy is higher for 
companies applying IAS/IFRS and US GAAP than 
for those applying German GAAP. 
If a company has to or can change its measurement 
method when new accounting principles are 
adopted, this may hamper forecast accuracy. Brown 
(1983) as well as Elliott and Philbrick (1990) pro-
vide evidence for this hypothesis for US companies. 
Furthermore, a change from prudent accounting 
principles to accounting principles that purport to 
provide a true and fair view of the financial position 
of company could change the importance analysts 
attach to the incorporation of public and of private 
information into the development of their forecasts. 
As Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) argue the 
forecast error of financial analysts can be divided 
into a common component resulting from errors in 
public information and an idiosyncratic component 
resulting from errors in private information. If the 
adoption of IAS/IFRS or US GAAP increases the 
errors in public information (Ashbaugh and Pincus 
2001) or makes analysts focus more on public 
rather than on private information even though the 
error in public information is high, forecast accuracy 
might deteriorate. 
Moreover, a change in the accounting principles 
applied may impair the possibility to extrapolate 
earnings trends as a restatement is only mandatory 
for one year prior to the adoption. This could nega-
tively influence the ability of analysts to forecast 
future earnings (Peek 2005). However, companies 
might have adjusted several choices in their finan-
cial statements under the previous accounting prin-
ciples (Daske 2005) or in the financial statements 
under the newly adopted accounting principles to 
smooth the adoption process. Whereas the first 
smoothing strategy should be possible for all com-
panies adopting IAAP, companies switching to US 
GAAP could not follow the second smoothing strat-
egy because of the relatively low extent of choices in 
US GAAP already mentioned above. 
Another argument for lower forecast accuracy after 
the adoption of other accounting principles can be 
derived from the functional fixation theory (Hand 
1990). According to this theory individuals tend to 
retain their decision-making process after a change 
in the accounting principles providing the informa-
tion for their decisions. When the adoption of a new 
accounting regime requires modifications, the deci-
sion-making process used beforehand might no 
longer be suitable and consequently forecast accu-
racy could deteriorate. Again, the smoothing strate-
gies mentioned above could mitigate this effect. 
Nevertheless, there is a potential reason for an in-
crease in forecast accuracy in the years of the adop-
tion of IAS/IFRS and US GAAP. Prior research 
shows that the motivation for accounting changes is 
to improve the informativeness of financial report-
ing (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar 1996). Therefore, fore-
cast accuracy should c.p. increase in the year of 
adoption, especially when additional disclosures, 
like reconciliations, are provided. 
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Despite the plausibility of the opposing view, we 
believe that the most likely effect of an adoption of 
new accounting principles is that forecast accuracy 
is lower for the year of change, because financial 
analysts might not be able to cope with such a great 
change in an important data source. As smoothing 
strategies are more likely for companies switching 
from German GAAP to IFRS we state the following 
research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  In the year of adoption of new 
accounting principles, forecast accuracy is lower 
than in other periods, especially for companies 
switching from German GAAP to US GAAP. 
According to Markov and Tamayo (2006), financial 
analysts learn about the parameters of companies’ 
earnings processes and thereby improve their fore-
casts. Such a relationship is suggested by studies at 
the individual analyst level showing that the firm-
specific experience of an analyst is positively associ-
ated with her forecast accuracy (Mikhail, Walther, 
and Willis 1997; Clement 1999; Clement, Rees, and 
Swanson 2003). Moreover, Markov and Tamayo 
(2006) argue that unanticipated shocks to the earn-
ings process may bias the learning process by rein-
troducing uncertainty. Subsequently, financial ana-
lysts need to learn again about the determinants of 
the earnings process. A change in the accounting 
principles as an important information basis for the 
earnings forecasts could be seen as such a shock. In 
the second year of applying IAAP the financial fig-
ures of the first year of adopting IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP and of at least one year of comparison pre-
ceding the year of adopting a new accounting re-
gime are available to financial analysts. Assuming 
that this information is already sufficient for ana-
lysts in order to evaluate the impact of adopting 
international accounting regimes on the financial 
statements of a company we state the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: In the year after the adoption of 
new accounting principles forecast accuracy is not 
different to that of other periods (except for the 
periods of adoption). 
4. Variables and models 
4.1 Dependent variable 
The study investigates the influence of different 
accounting regimes on the forecast accuracy of fi-
nancial analysts. Therefore, we regress a measure of 
forecast accuracy as dependent variable on the vari-
ables that are examined and on several control vari-
ables as independent variables. 
Similar to other studies on the determinants of fore-
cast accuracy (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003; 
Hope 2004), we define forecast accuracy of a com-
pany’s earnings per share (EPS) as follows: 
 
monthforecast  the
 of middle at the priceStock 
EPS forecastedMedian  EPS Actual
FA_MEDIAN
−−=  
 
We have made two modifications in comparison to 
previous definitions. First, we use the median of the 
estimates during a specified period as a consensus 
forecast and not the mean, because the median is 
less sensitive to outliers. In order to control for the 
influence of this modification on the result, we con-
ducted a sensitivity analysis using the mean of the 
estimates alternatively and found no material differ-
ences in the results (see Section 8 for details). Sec-
ond, we do not use the median of an entire fiscal 
year, but rather of each month before the report 
date, i.e. the date when the actual EPS is reported by 
the company. This enables us to control for the ef-
fect that forecasts closer to the report date are usu-
ally better than earlier forecasts by using a control 
variable. Due to this modification we use the stock 
price at the middle of the forecast month as deflator 
to facilitate comparisons across observations. 
4.2 Independent variables 
The first hypothesis is tested by including dummy 
variables for the type of accounting regime applied 
into the regression. Taking German GAAP as a ref-
erence group, we use IFRS that takes the value 1 if 
the actual EPS is based on IAS/IFRS and 0 other-
wise as well as US that takes the value 1 if the actual 
EPS is based on US GAAP and 0 otherwise. Assum-
ing that hypothesis 1 is true, these dummy variables 
should be significant and positive in a regression on 
the forecast accuracy. 
To test the second hypothesis, we define the dummy 
variable ADOPT which takes the value 1 when the 
forecast is made in a month of the year a company 
adopted IFRS or US GAAP and 0 otherwise. Using 
this variable as well as lagged accounting regime 
dummies indicating the type of accounting princi-
ples applied in the previous year (HGB-1, IFRS-1, 
US-1), we construct interaction terms to indicate 
what type of switch of the accounting principles 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 1 | Issue 1 | May 2008 | 26-53 
33 
occurred in the respective fiscal period, i.e. from 
German GAAP to IAS/IFRS (ADOPT * IFRS *  
HGB-1), from US GAAP to IAS/IFRS (ADOPT * 
IFRS * US-1), from German GAAP to US GAAP 
(ADOPT * US * HGB-1) or from IFRS to US GAAP 
(ADOPT * US * IFRS-1). Under the assumption that 
hypothesis 2 applies, at least the interaction term 
indicating a switch from German GAAP to US GAAP 
should be significant and have a negative sign in a 
regression on forecast accuracy. 
Moreover, we use the interaction terms ADOPT-1 * 
IFRS as well as ADOPT-1 * US for testing hypothesis 
3. A value of 1 for these interaction terms means 
that IFRS or US GAAP, respectively, was adopted in 
the previous year, i.e. the observation refers to the 
second fiscal year of applying IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. Hypothesis 3 implies that the forecast accu-
racy for such years is not significantly different in 
comparison to other periods (except for the periods 
of adoption) and thus these interactions terms 
should not be significant in a regression on forecast 
accuracy. 
4.3 Control variables 
Following previous studies, we include several con-
trol variables into the regression. TIME refers to the 
number of days between the report date and the 
date of the consensus forecast. Figure 2 illustrates 
the calculation of the variable TIME. In a certain 
year (2003 and 2004 in the example) we focus on 
consensus estimates during the time period between 
two report dates (15/03/2003 – 15/03/2004 and 
15/03/2004 – 15/02/2005 in the example) regard-
less of the length of this period (12 months and 11 
months in the example). The single forecasts of 
analysts during this period are valid for a maximum 
of 105 days (as defined by IBES) or until the earlier 
of the report date or the withdrawing of the forecast 
by the respective analyst. The consensus forecast of 
all valid single forecasts is calculated at the middle 
of all months within the period between two report 
dates (e.g. at 15/06/2003 and 15/09/2004 in the 
example). The period between the date of the con-
sensus forecast and the report date is defined as 
TIME for this consensus forecast (15/03/2004 –  
Figure 2: Illustration of calculating the variable TIME 
 
31/12/2002 31/12/200431/12/2003Fiscal period end date
15/03/2003 15/02/200515/03/2004Earnings report date
12 months 11 months
12 months 12 months
t
31/12/2002 31/12/200431/12/2003Fiscal period end date
15/03/2003 15/02/200515/03/2004Earnings report date
t
IBES monthly consensus forecast
(includes all single forecasts made
in the last 105 days)
15/06/2003 15/09/2004
274 days 153 daysTIME independent variable
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15/06/2003 = 274 days and 15/02/2005 – 
15/09/2004 = 153 days). 
As already mentioned, forecasts issued earlier are 
likely to be less accurate than forecasts issued closer 
to the time earnings are announced. The reason for 
this is that the analysts have less information avail-
able and thus higher uncertainty about a company’s 
results in a fiscal year. Accordingly, this relationship 
is documented by several studies (e.g., Brown, 
Richardson, and Schwager 1987; Lys and Soo 1995; 
Das and Saudaragan 1998; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 
1999; Duru and Reeb 2002). We expect a negative 
sign for this variable in the regression on forecast 
accuracy. 
Similar to several previous studies (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Hope 2003a; Hope 2003b), we use 
firm size as a control variable. The variable MCAP 
represents the market capitalization at the middle of 
the month for which the consensus forecast is made. 
We use the natural logarithm of this variable as 
MCAP itself is heavily skewed. Log(MCAP) is con-
sidered to be a proxy for the information environ-
ment of a company, as large companies are more 
likely to provide additional information to the public 
or more private information (Jaggi and Jain 1998) 
to the analysts than smaller companies. This would 
imply a positive coefficient on log(MCAP). Firm size 
is also seen as a proxy for other company-specific 
factors, like management incentives for which pre-
dictions are unclear (Hope 2003a). 
COVERAGE stands for the number of analysts fol-
lowing a company in a month. This variable is a 
proxy for the intensity of competition (Lys and Soo 
1995) and thus for the incentives to forecast accu-
rately (Hope 2003a). As the forecast accuracy of the 
consensus forecast should be higher when more 
analysts estimate, we expect a positive estimated 
coefficient on COVERAGE. 
Moreover, we define dummy variables for the mem-
bership in one of the market segments of the Ger-
man Stock Exchange. Taking companies not in-
cluded in a stock index as a reference group, we 
differentiate between the following indices: DAX, 
MDAX, TECDAX, NEW_MARKET, and SDAX. 
DAX stands for the German blue-chip segment 
comprising the 30 largest and most actively traded 
German companies. MDAX is the mid-cap segment, 
and TECDAX (founded in 2003) is the technology 
sector segment. NEW_MARKET stands for the 
“Neuer Markt”, which was the German market seg-
ment for technology stocks and was replaced by the 
TECDAX in 2003. SDAX (called SMAX until 2002) 
is the small-cap segment. A consensus forecast of a 
month is given the value 1 for one of these variables 
if the company for which the forecast is made be-
longs to the respective market segment in this 
month (on the respective forecast date), and 0 oth-
erwise. To our knowledge, these dummy variables 
have never been used before in an empirical study 
on analysts’ forecast accuracy. Nevertheless, we 
believe that they are good proxies for the informa-
tion environment of a German listed company, be-
cause these market indices are characterized by 
additional information requirements (e.g. concern-
ing quarterly reports). Moreover, the DAX requires 
a higher free float than the other market segments 
(German Stock Exchange 2007). Finally, the visibil-
ity of the DAX is highest followed by the MDAX, the 
TECDAX, and the SDAX. The New Market also had 
a very high visibility during its existence, especially 
in the years 1998–2001, and had additional infor-
mation requirements. Therefore, we expect that 
forecast accuracy for companies belonging to one of 
these market segments is higher than for stocks 
belonging to none of these segments. Furthermore, 
forecast accuracy is probably highest for the DAX 
followed by the New Market and the MDAX.  
As we will show in Section 6 only one of the last 
three controls (i.e. log(MCAP), COVERAGE, or the 
index dummy variables) is included in the analyses 
to avoid multicollinearity. 
Plumlee (2003) finds that the complexity of the 
forecasting task is negatively associated with fore-
cast accuracy. We expect the complexity of the fore-
casting task and, thus, the forecast errors to be posi-
tively correlated with a stock’s risk. As the consen-
sus forecast of a stock is often viewed as the surro-
gate for market expectations about that company, 
we add BETA as a variable covering systematic risk 
to proxy for difficulties in forecasting risky results. 
BETA is the fundamental or predicted beta of a 
company in the investigated period. In financial 
theory, beta is a gauge of the expected response of 
the stock to the overall market portfolio. The pre-
dicted beta is derived from Barra’s German equity 
risk model, which is a multifactor risk model includ-
ing 12 risk attributes (e.g. leverage, earnings vari-
ability ability, growth, and liquidity) plus industry 
exposure. Table 1 gives an overview of all risk attrib-
utes used in Barra’s German equity risk model. 
These risk attributes are operationalized by calculat-
ing 43 variables, so-called descriptors. We do not 
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use historical betas, which are calculated by running 
a regression (often over 60 months) on a stock’s 
excess returns against the market’s excess returns, 
mainly for two reasons: First, the historical beta 
does not recognize fundamental changes in the 
company’s operations, like spin-offs. Second, it is 
influenced by events specific to the company that 
are unlikely to be repeated. As we use company-
specific predicted betas that are re-estimated each 
month (Barra 2005; Barra 2006), BETA reflects 
changes in the company’s underlying risk structure 
in a timely manner. 
 
Table 1: Factors in Barra’s German equity 
risk model 
 
Hwang, Jan, and Basu (1996) and Das (1998) show 
that forecast accuracy is lower for firm years with 
negative earnings. This means, forecasting seems to 
be more difficult for firms reporting negative earn-
ings. One reason might be that earnings manage-
ment is higher in loss years, e.g. by “big bath ac-
counting”. Therefore, we include the control vari-
able LOSS. It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the actual EPS to which a consensus forecast be-
longs to is negative and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, 
we include a similar dummy variable for loss in the 
previous fiscal period called LOSS-1. This variable 
should also have a negative sign according to previ-
ous research (Peek 2005). 
Companies that are cross-listed in the US have a 
different information environment, because they 
commit themselves to increased disclosure (Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000). Moreover, cross-listed com-
panies are subject to SEC enforcement which could 
be seen as stricter than German enforcement during 
the investigated period. This should lead to higher 
forecast accuracy, as Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) 
show for a sample of 235 cross-listed companies. In 
contrast, Germany could be regarded as a country 
with a well-established enforcement by auditors 
mitigating this effect. As cross-listed companies 
might be more intensively involved in international 
operations and thus have earnings that are more 
difficult to estimate, a negative association with the 
forecast accuracy might arise. To control for the 
cross-listing effect we include the variable 
US_CROSSLIST in our analysis. This dummy vari-
able indicates whether a company is cross-listed in 
the US in a sample period (value 1) or not (value 0). 
As a study by Higgins (2002) for the US shows, 
forecast accuracy is significantly and positively asso-
ciated with the macroeconomic environment. We 
therefore include GDP as a control variable, which 
stands for the change in the world gross domestic 
product in the year the fiscal period of the consen-
sus forecast ends. 
In addition, we include dummy variables for the 
years in which the respective fiscal period of a com-
pany ends. Thereby, we take 1998 as a reference 
group. These dummy variables are proxies for time-
specific effects influencing the forecast accuracy of 
financial analysts and for changes in the accounting 
standards of German GAAP, IAS/IFRS, and US 
GAAP during the investigated period. 
Forecast accuracy is shown to vary across industries 
(e.g. O’Brien 1990). For Germany it was found to be 
lower for dynamic and competitive industries (e.g. 
electronics, automobile) (Hüfner and Möller 1997). 
We therefore include dummy variables for the two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of 
the companies in our model taking depository insti-
tutions (SIC_60) as a reference group. 
Risk 
factor 
Description 
Volatility Predicts a company’s market responsiveness based on its 
historical behavior. In addition to historical beta, this 
index contains other measures of market-based volatility. 
Momentum Measures the success of a stock over the last year.  
Yield Measures the company’s current dividend yield and yield 
over previous years. 
Leverage Measures the financial leverage of a company. 
Size Values total assets and market capitalization to differenti-
ate between large and small stocks. 
Value Captures the extent to which a company’s ongoing busi-
ness is priced inexpensively in the marketplace by looking 
at book to price, cash flow to price, and revenues to price. 
Earnings 
Yield 
Consists of return on equity and earnings to price ratios. 
Stocks with similar values of earnings yield behave in a 
similar fashion with respect to their returns. 
Growth Measures growth in net earnings, cash-flow and return on 
equity, plus recent change in earnings. 
Earnings 
Variability 
Measures the historical variability in earnings and cash 
flows. 
Liquidity Measures the amount of relative trading in each stock. 
Stocks that are highly traded are likely to be those with 
greater institutional interest. Such stocks may display 
different returns behavior compared with those that are 
not widely held by institutions. 
Foreign 
Income 
Reflects the ratio of revenue and income earned outside 
Germany to total revenue and income. 
Exchange 
Rate 
Measures the sensitivity of a company’s stock return to 
the return on a basket of foreign currencies. 
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4.4 Models 
We use two different types of models for testing our 
hypotheses. The first model includes the dummy 
variables for the accounting principles and the con-
trol variables explained above: 
 
(1)  FA_MEDIANi,t =  
α0 + α1 IFRSi,t + α2 USi,t + control variables + εi,t, 
 
where all variables are for consensus forecast for 
company i in the month t. 
Similar to model (1), we use the following model (2) 
to also test the second and third hypotheses. This 
model not only includes the dummy variables for 
the accounting principles applied but also dummy 
variables if new accounting principles were adopted 
in the actual (ADOPT) or the previous (ADOPT-1) 
period: 
 
(2)  FA_MEDIANi,t = 
β0 + β1 IFRSi,t + β2 USi,t + β3 ADOPTi,t * IFRSi,t * HGB-1i,t 
+ β4 ADOPTi,t * IFRSi,t * US-1i,t + β5 ADOPTi,t * USi,t * HGB-1i,t  
+ β6 ADOPTi,t * USi,t * IFRS-1i,t + β7 ADOPT-1i,t * IFRSi,t  
+ β8 ADOPT-1i,t * USi,t + control variables + ζi,t, 
 
where all variables are for consensus forecast for 
company i in the month t. 
5. Sample 
5.1 Restriction to Germany 
We restrict our study to one country, namely Ger-
many. This allows us to control effectively for differ-
ences in institutional factors, like regulatory re-
quirements or the enforcement system. Such factors 
have been shown to vary across countries and to be 
important determinants of analysts’ forecast quality 
(Hope 2003a; Hope 2003b; Hope 2004; Barniv, 
Myring, and Thomas 2005). 
We selected Germany for our analyses for mainly 
two reasons: First, Germany provides a unique 
framework, because many publicly traded German 
companies successively switched to IAAP before 
2005. In the mid-1990s German companies volun-
tarily started to apply such principles before 1998; a 
law (“Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz (Kap-
AEG)” – “Capital Raising Act”) officially allowed 
publicly listed companies to report consolidated 
financial statements according to IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP, substituting the rules of German GAAP (Hal-
ler 2002). Since then more and more listed compa-
nies in Germany have switched to IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. Moreover, the application of IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP was mandatory for companies listed in the 
New Market segment of the German Stock Ex-
change. The gradual adoption of these accounting 
regimes by German listed companies allows us to 
control for macroeconomic or other variables which 
could change over time. 
Second, German GAAP is expected to be signifi-
cantly different to IAS/IFRS and US GAAP which 
should make the effects of adopting IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP more transparent. Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, and 
Stolowy (2007) provide evidence for the high degree 
of differences between IAS/IFRS and German 
GAAP. 
5.2 Sample period 
The investigated period is 1998–2004. We take 
1998 as the starting point because this is the year 
the KapAEG was enacted. This means that from 
1998 onwards companies are allowed to provide 
financial statements prepared under IAS/IFRS or 
US GAAP instead of German GAAP. In prior periods 
companies applying IAAP provide a second set of 
financial statements based on German GAAP, dis-
close only reconciliations to earnings and stock-
holders’ equity under IAAP, or publish “dual-
financial statements” which are stated to be in com-
pliance with two accounting regimes (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). Moreover, since July 1, 1998 a 
revision of IAS 1 has been effective, which requires 
companies to comply with all standards in order to 
claim compliance with IAS/IFRS. In addition, sev-
eral core standards of the IAS were published (e.g. 
IAS 36 “Impairment of Assets”; IAS 37 “Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets”; IAS 
38 “Intangible Assets”; IAS 39 “Financial Instru-
ments: Recognition and Measurement”) or revised 
(IAS 16 “Property, Plant and Equipment”; IAS 19 
“Employee Benefits”; IAS 22 “Business Combina-
tions”) in 1998. Furthermore, in April 1998 audit 
reforms were passed into law that changed the ob-
jectives and the reporting requirements of audits 
(Haller and Eierle 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife and Gas-
sen 2006). 
The analysis ends with the year 2004 for several 
reasons: First, since 2005, IFRS has been manda-
tory for nearly all consolidated financial statements 
of publicly traded companies in the EU and is no 
longer voluntary. Moreover, in December 2004 a 
new enforcement system was established in Ger-
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many which could have an impact on the forecast 
accuracy of financial analysts. In addition, for fiscal 
years beginning on or after April 2004 revisions of 
IFRS 3 “Business Combinations” and of IAS 36 
“Impairment of Assets” requiring the impairment-
only approach for goodwill is effective. This could 
have an impact on the forecast accuracy as well. 
During the period of investigation several rule 
changes have also taken place: For example, under 
US GAAP SFAS 141 “Business Combinations” and 
SFAS 142 “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets” 
were issued in 2001 and under IAS/IFRS a revised 
version of IAS 39 was issued in 2000. On the one 
hand, these new standards aim at improving the 
decision usefulness of financial statements and, 
therefore, should lead to a higher forecast accuracy.  
On the other hand, the higher complexity of the new 
standards (especially of the new goodwill impair-
ment test under US GAAP) as well as the adoption 
effects might lead to an opposite effect. Under Ger-
man GAAP the Transparency Act (Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz, TransPuG), which was issued 
in July 2002, abolished the option to include tax-
induced accounting practices in the consolidated 
accounts (§ 308 III HGB was deleted) which could 
also have a positive impact on the transparency of 
financial statements and thus on forecast accuracy. 
To control for the impacts of rule changes we in- 
clude dummies for the respective years in our analy-
ses. 
Our study is based on IBES monthly EPS analyst 
consensus forecasts from 1998 to 2004. We investi-
gate companies, which are classified as German-
based companies by IBES and listed at a German 
stock exchange. To ensure that the financial analysts 
had the last financial statements available for the 
forecast of the EPS of the current fiscal period we 
only take consensus forecasts that were published 
not more than one year before the report date. 
 
5.3 Variables and data sources 
Table 2 provides details of the variables used in the 
analysis and their sources. Data for calculating the 
dependent variable are from IBES (analysts’ con-
sensus forecasts, actual earnings, share price as a 
deflator). Actual earnings under German GAAP are 
DVFA adjusted, i.e. they are before certain special 
items defined by the DVFA, and for IAS/IFRS and 
US GAAP they are before extraordinary items. The 
type of accounting principles applied is hand col-
lected from the annual reports of the companies as 
we found several missing or even mistakable entries 
in Datastream. The time when the forecast is made 
and also the fiscal year end are provided by IBES as 
well as the market value of companies and the 
number of analysts following. 
Table 2: Overview of variables and of data sources 
 
Variable(s) Explanation Data  
source 
Variable(s) Explanation Data 
source 
FA_MEDIAN 
 
Negative value of the absolute difference between the 
actual EPS and the monthly consensus analyst forecast 
scaled by the stock price at the middle of the forecast 
month in % (winsorized at the 99th percentile). 
IBES BETA Predicted beta of a company at the beginning 
of the month calculated from a multifactor 
model. 
BARRA  
HGB, IFRS, US 
(HGB-1,  
IFRS-1, US-1) 
Dummy variables indicating that the month belongs to a 
fiscal period (a fiscal period following a fiscal period) in 
which the respective accounting principles were applied. 
German GAAP (variable HGB) serves as a reference 
group for the variables IFRS and US. HGB-1, IFRS-1, and 
US-1 are only used for the interaction terms in model (2). 
Hand-collected 
from annual 
reports 
LOSS 
(LOSS-1) 
Dummy variable indicating that the month 
belongs to a fiscal period (a fiscal period 
following the fiscal period) in which a loss 
occurred. 
Based on 
data from 
IBES 
ADOPT 
(ADOPT-1) 
Dummy variable indicating that the month belongs to a 
fiscal period (a fiscal period following the fiscal period) in 
which new accounting principles were adopted. 
Based on hand-
collected data 
from annual 
reports 
US_CROSSLIST Dummy variable indicating a cross-listing in 
the US. 
EDGAR 
database of 
the SEC 
TIME Time period (in days) between announcement of the 
consensus forecast and announcement of the actual EPS. 
IBES GDP Change in the world gross domestic product 
(in percent) in the year to which the respective 
month belongs to. 
Interna-
tional 
Monetary 
Fund 
Log(MCAP) Natural logarithm of the market capitalization (in million 
EUROs) at the middle of the forecast month. 
IBES YEAR_1999, ..., 
YEAR_2004  
Year to which the respective month belongs to 
(with 1998 as a reference group).  
IBES 
COVERAGE Number of analysts following. IBES 
DAX, MDAX, 
TECDAX, 
NEW_MARKET, 
SDAX 
Dummy variables for the market segments of the German 
Stock Exchange (with companies belonging to no index 
as a reference group). 
Based on data 
from the Ger-
man Stock 
Exchange 
SIC_14, ..., 
SIC_96 
51 dummy variables for the two-digit SIC code 
of the industry a company belongs to (with 
SIC_60 as a reference group). 
Datastream 
 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 1 | Issue 1 | May 2008 | 26-53 
38 
Data for membership of one of the capital market 
segments (DAX, MDAX, TECDAX, NEW_MAR-
KET, SDAX) is assigned by hand to the observations 
based on a list on the composition of these indices 
provided by the German Stock Exchange. The pre-
dicted BETA is from Barra and the LOSS dummy 
variables are calculated from the actual earnings 
provided by IBES. The data for the cross-listing of 
companies (US_CROSSLIST) are taken from the 
EDGAR database of the SEC. GDP data are from the 
International Monetary Fund and the SIC codes 
from Datastream. 
5.4 Sample selection 
The whole sample of consensus forecasts for Ger-
man listed companies from 1998–2004 for a maxi-
mum time period of one year ahead and for which 
the actual EPS (in EURO or Deutsche Mark4) and 
the report date are available from IBES consists of 
28,552 observations. We exclude observations that 
are not based on consolidated accounts or where the 
type of accounting principles applied could not be 
determined (2,136). We also deleted observations 
where the fiscal year is not equal to 365 or 366 days 
(1,437). Moreover, we eliminated observations 
where one or more independent variables are not 
available (2,520). To avoid selection bias, we do not 
follow previous studies by eliminating observations 
with fiscal years that do not end on December 31. 
We end up with a final sample of 22,459 monthly 
consensus forecasts for 591 companies. This is a 
considerably larger sample than the one used by 
Daske (2005) who examined the forecast accuracy 
for a sample of at most 13,929 observations depend-
ing on the model used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 The observations which were denoted in Deutsche Mark 
were translated into EURO with the official exchange rate of 
1,95583 Deutsche Mark per EURO. 
6. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy data and the numeric 
control variables. The mean of the forecast error (i.e. 
the negative of the forecast accuracy as defined 
above) for the overall sample is –14.80% of the 
stock price with a standard deviation of 41.83%. The 
average time period between the date of the an-
nouncement of the consensus forecast and the an-
nouncement of the actual EPS is 172 days. The mar-
ket capitalization of the companies investigated is 
between 1 million and 271,452 million EURO, with a 
mean of 2,721 million EURO. The coverage of ana-
lysts ranges between 1 and 49 with a mean of 9.64 
and a median of 5. The mean of the predicted betas 
is 0.8624, the median 0.8110.5  
Finally, the world gross domestic product change 
had a mean of 3.73% and median of 3.70% during 
the period 1998–2004. 
Moreover, we examine the difference of the vari-
ables for observations based on different accounting 
regimes. Referring to hypothesis 1, we focus on the 
differences between HGB and the international 
accounting regimes IAS/IFRS and US GAAP. Table 
4 provides the results of this comparison. As can be 
seen from the table, tests for equality of means and 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicate that all variables 
of the HGB sample are significantly different from 
the sample of companies applying international 
accounting regimes. While TIME, MCAP, COVER-
AGE, BETA, and the number of LOSS observations 
are higher for the sample of IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP observations than for the sample of HGB 
observations, for the forecast accuracy FA_ME-
DIAN the relationship is the other way round. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 The mean beta weighted with the market capitalization of 
the company is 0.9539. This indicates that our sample is a 
good proxy for the market portfolio which, reconciled with the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, is expected to have a weighted 
beta of 1. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
           
                      
     Mean    Median    Minimum    Maximum    Std. Dev. 
           
           
FA_MEDIAN  -14.80  -1.89  -290.10  0  41.83 
TIME  172  168  1  365  101.76 
MCAP  2,721   162  1  271,452  10,214  
COVERAGE  9.64  5  1  49  10.34 
BETA  0.8624  0.8110  -0.1480  1.9730  0.3722 
GDP  3.73  3.70  2.60  5.30  0.97 
                      
For a description of the variables see Table 2. 
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To analyze the difference in more detail, Table 5 
presents the means of the most important variables 
for the years and accounting regimes. The number 
of observations based on German GAAP decreases, 
while the number of observations based on 
IAS/IFRS increases until 2001 and is nearly con-
stant afterwards. For US GAAP, the number of ob-
servations increases from 143 in 1998 to 1,442 in 
2001 and decreases afterwards. 
The means of TIME, MCAP, and COVERAGE are 
similar across all years and accounting principles. 
Exceptions are the US GAAP and in particular the 
IAS observations in 1998 and 1999. In these years, 
large companies with high analyst coverage, in par-
ticular, applied IAS and US GAAP. The means for 
the forecast accuracy and the predicted betas are 
significantly different between the three accounting 
regimes. German GAAP companies reveal lower 
betas than IAS/IFRS or US GAAP companies for the 
entire sample period. This confirms the results in 
Table 4. The forecast accuracy is, particularly for the 
years 2001–2003, higher for estimates based on 
GAAP than for those based on IAAP, whereas for 
the years 1998 and 1999 the relationship is the other 
way around. The higher overall forecast accuracy for 
German GAAP observations could suggest that the 
forecast accuracy is higher for German GAAP than 
for IAS/IFRS or US GAAP, but more of the observa-
tions based on IAS/IFRS (34.26%) and US GAAP 
(44.82%) refer to LOSS years than observations 
based on German GAAP (16.07%) and – as stated 
above – losses are shown to be more difficult to 
estimate. In addition, companies applying IAS 
/IFRS and US GAAP on average are more risky than 
companies applying German GAAP as measured by 
their BETA, which is shown to make the forecast 
more difficult. This relationship holds for each year 
investigated and the difference is shown to be sig-
nificant in Table 4. Moreover, the industry distribu-
tion is different between companies applying Ger-
man GAAP and those applying IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. Finally, the observations based on IAS/IFRS 
or US GAAP could be biased by adoption effects, 
which are controlled for in model (2) of the multi-
variate analyses. 
Table 6 depicts the correlations between the vari-
ables. As expected, forecast accuracy is positively 
correlated with the market capitalization of a com-
pany (MCAP), number of analysts following the 
stock (COVERAGE), and with the economic situa-
tion expressed by the change in the gross domestic 
product in a year (GDP). Consistently, the type of 
market segment of the German Stock Exchange 
(INDEX) is also positively correlated with forecast 
accuracy which means that forecast accuracy is 
higher for companies in “higher” stock segments, 
i.e. in the DAX than for companies in the MDAX, 
TECDAX, or other indices. The Spearman correla-
tion indicates that forecast accuracy decreases as the 
forecast horizon measured by the time period be-
tween the announcement of the consensus forecast 
and the announcement of the actual EPS increases. 
Table 4: Differences between variables for HGB observations and IAS/IFRS as well as US 
GAAP observations 
         
        
Total HGB     IAS/IFRS and 
US GAAP 
Total 
   t-statistics   Z-statistics    
        
        
FA_MEDIAN -9.1166 (16.08) *** (-15.45) *** -17.6137 -14.8049 
TIME 170 (-2.22) ** (-2.16) ** 173  172 
MCAP 2,408 (-2.96) *** (-16.66) *** 2,876 2,721 
COVERAGE 9.10 (-5.69) *** (-5.88) *** 9.90 9.64 
BETA 0.6253 (-81.97) *** (-69.38) ***  0.9795  0.8624 
LOSS obs. 1,193 (16.07%) (-38.10) *** (-33.83) *** 5,750 (38.24%) 6,943 (30.91%) 
N 7,424     15,035 22,459 
           
The table shows the means of different variables. For a description of the variables see Table 2. The figures in brackets are  
t-statistics (test for equality of means without assuming equal variances) and tie-adjusted Z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank sum test). *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
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Moreover, there is a negative relationship of the 
forecast accuracy with the complexity of the fore-
casting task measured by the predicted beta 
(BETA). These correlations are consistent with the 
predictions for these variables. Among the control 
variables, MCAP and COVERAGE, MCAP and IN-
DEX, as well as INDEX and COVERAGE reveal the 
highest correlations. To avoid multicollinearity, we 
use three specifications for each model in which 
only one of these three control variables is included. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the years and accounting principles applied 
 
 
Year AP FA_MEDIAN TIME MCAP  COVERAGE BET LOSS obs.  N 
 
 
 HGB -3.9015 (14.52) 172 (101) 1,695 (7,317) 9.41 (10.31) 0.6048 (0.2370) 231 (11.01%)  2,098 
1998 IAS -0.9212 (1.24) 168 (102) 10,745 (16,498) 22.56 (12.43) 0.8368 (0.1989) 0   (0.00%)  272 
 US -1.6104 (2.65) 161 (99) 5,237 (15,075) 13.70 (11.96) 0.7422 (0.1779) 23 (16.08%)  143 
               
 HGB -10.1114 (39.14) 171 (101) 2,686 (16,519) 9.96 (9.22) 0.6204 (0.2409) 182 (11.18%)  1,628 
1999 IAS -2.5049 (6.63) 170 (101) 5,958 (12,329) 15.64 (12.05) 0.8103 (0.2207) 39   (6.16%)  633 
 US -2.9292  (6.22) 164 (100) 4,756 (14,777) 13.43 (10.50) 0.8598 (0.2209) 98 (28.16%)  348 
               
 HGB -9.8308  (32.98) 172 (103) 3,092 (15,018) 8.19 (9.20) 0.6413 (0.2930) 221 (16.67%)  1,326 
2000 IAS -9.9474 (34.38) 170 (102) 3,894 (12,666) 8.55 (9.54) 0.9084  (0.2951) 476 (37.01%)  1,286 
 US -12.0189 (39.74) 175 (103) 2,969 (9,323) 7.91 (7.93) 0.9572 (0.2982) 395 (43.99%)  898 
               
 HGB -11.7312 (32.24) 161 (99) 2,118 (9,290) 8.98 (9.15) 0.6692 (0.2630) 209 (22.02%)  949 
2001 IFRS -23.4805 (50.17) 174 (103) 2,362 (8,417) 8.65 (10.07) 1.0852 (0.3457) 992 (50.38%)  1,969 
 US -20.5169 (41.70) 176 (103) 2,662 (10,264) 8.78 (9.45) 1.1982 (0.3521) 860 (59.64%)  1,442 
               
 HGB -21.6588 (55.97) 168 (99) 2,159 (7,798) 9.75 (10.31) 0.6890 (0.3912) 220 (36.07%)  610 
2002 IFRS -43.9995 (74.66)  164 (96) 1,694 (5,460) 9.74 (11.11) 0.9893  (0.3701) 889 (50.03%)  1,777 
 US -27.7034 (57.94) 164 (95) 2,292  (8,931) 9.94 (10.73) 1.1338 (0.3589) 578 (48.09%)   1,202 
               
 HGB -8.5188 (27.43) 170 (102) 2,843 (9,749) 8.68 (9.45) 0.5545 (0.2957) 72 (16.67%)  432 
2003 IFRS -14.8287 (40.29) 179 (104) 1,864  (4,541) 9.55 (10.90) 0.8193  (0.3550) 472 (29.30%)  1,611 
 US -10.4549 (28.48) 180 (105) 2,550  (8,336) 9.87 (10.74) 0.9938  (0.3471) 392 (41.00%)  956 
               
 HGB -5.1814 (11.38) 173 (105) 3,394  (11,431) 6.56 (9.46) 0.5717 (0.2680) 58 (15.22%)  381 
2004 IFRS -7.1164 (23.19) 181 (104) 2,103 (4,841) 9.51 (10.07) 0.8729  (0.3587) 339 (18.70%)  1,813 
 US -5.9259  (15.21) 183 (105) 4,326  (11,899) 10.47 (11.10) 1.0439  (0.3493) 197 (28.76%)  685 
               
 HGB -9.1166 (32.44)  170 (101) 2,408 (11,989) 9.10 (9.68) 0.6253 (0.2743) 1,193 (16.07%)  7,424 
Total IAS/IFRS -18.7843 (48.25) 173  (102) 2,797 (8,485) 10.04 (10.91) 0.9300  (0.3519) 3,207 (34.26%)  9,361 
 US -15.6823 (40.48) 174  (102) 3,007  (10,291) 9.69  (10.18) 1.0611  (0.3536) 2,543 (44.82%)  5,674 
 TOTAL -14.8049 (41.83)  172 (102) 2,721 (10,214)  9.64 (10.34)  0.8624 (0.3722) 6,943 (30.91%)   22,459 
 
The table shows the means of different variables. For a description of the variables see Table 2. AP means type of accounting principles 
applied and N number of observations. The figures in brackets represent the standard deviation, except for LOSS obs. (for which we 
report the percentage of observations with a negative net income). 
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7. Regression results 
Table 7 presents the regression results for model (1). 
As we include either Log(MCAP), COVERAGE, or 
the index dummies as control variables in the 
model, we report the results of three different speci-
fication of this model, i.e. (1a)-(1c). To control effec-
tively for the panel data structure of our sample, we 
report standard errors clustered by firm in the table 
(Petersen 2007). Consistent with hypothesis 1, in all 
three models the accounting principles dummies 
(IFRS and US) are positively and significantly (at 
least at the 1% level for US GAAP and at least at the 
5% level for IAS/IFRS) related to forecast accuracy. 
These findings suggest that the forecast accuracy of 
financial analysts varies across accounting princi-
ples. Assuming that financial analysts have incen-
tives to provide accurate forecasts the accuracy 
seems to be higher for IFRS and US GAAP based 
observations than for German GAAP-based obser-
vations which served as a reference group in the 
analysis. Our results are similar to those from 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). However, contrary to 
the findings of Daske (2005) we provide evidence of 
higher forecast accuracy for IAAP in Germany. 
These differences might be due to the use of differ-
ent samples and/or methodologies.  
We additionally test the hypothesis that forecast 
accuracy is equal for IFRS and US GAAP by using a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wald coefficient test of the equality of the two coef-
ficients of IFRS and US. For all three models, the 
test shows that the hypothesis is rejected (with F-
statistics of 9.31, 10.96, and 6.39 for models (1a), 
(1b), and (1c), respectively). This indicates that ap-
plying US GAAP results in a higher forecast accu-
racy than IFRS. 
The coefficients of the control variables TIME, 
BETA, LOSS, and LOSS-1 have the expected sign 
implying that forecast accuracy is higher for obser-
vations with a shorter time period before EPS an-
nouncement, with a lower predicted beta and with 
no loss in the actual or previous year. In contrast to 
the results of Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), 
US_CROSSLIST has a negative sign, but is only 
significant in models (1a) and (1b). GDP is signifi-
cant (at least at the 10% level) in all three models. 
This result is consistent with the prediction and with 
the result of Higgins (2002). 
The alternative control variables Log(MCAP), COV-
ERAGE, and the index dummies have positive coef-
ficients and are highly significant in the respective 
models. The only exception is the dummy for the 
SDAX for which the forecast accuracy is not signifi-
cantly different to the reference group, i.e. observa-
tions from companies not included in any stock-
market index. 
 
Table 6: Correlations 
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FA_MEDIAN  0.096 -0.080 -0.012 0.002 0.036 0.005 0.082 0.178 0.193 -0.293 0.111 
HGB 0.103  -0.594 -0.409 -0.187 -0.200 -0.015 -0.022 -0.037 0.022 -0.448 -0.127 
IFRS -0.028 -0.594  -0.492 0.189 0.162 0.007 0.006 0.033 0.015 0.154 0.119 
US -0.080 -0.409 -0.492  -0.012 0.033 0.008 0.016 0.003 -0.040 0.310 0.002 
ADOPT 0.066 -0.187 0.189 -0.012  -0.090 -0.012 0.046 0.088 0.100 -0.035 -0.026 
ADOPT-1 0.064 -0.200 0.162 0.033 -0.090  -0.012 0.066 0.062 0.065 -0.018 0.026 
TIME -0.114 -0.014 0.007 0.008 -0.012 -0.012  0.016 0.054 0.019 -0.007 0.035 
MCAP 0.492 0.111 -0.042 -0.073 0.092 0.090 0.050  0.537 0.415 0.065 0.024 
COVERAGE 0.303 -0.039 0.007 0.034 0.085 0.072 0.058 0.697  0.822 0.055 -0.037 
INDEX 0.315 0.057 -0.011 -0.049 0.088 0.065 0.014 0.718 0.741  -0.071 0.059 
BETA -0.255 -0.463 0.174 0.304 -0.029 -0.012 -0.002 -0.215 0.075 -0.096  -0.064 
GDP 0.113 -0.115 0.115 -0.006 -0.017 0.036 0.033 0.130 -0.040 0.085 -0.074  
                       
This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients above and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. For a description of the 
variables see Table 2. Bold numbers indicate a significant difference from zero at the 5% level (based on a two-tailed test). To concisely 
provide a general direction of the correlation of INDEX with other variables, we numbered the INDEX dummy variables (1: no index, 2: 
SDAX, 3: NEW_MARKET, 4: TecDAX, 5: MDAX, 6: DAX) to obtain a single INDEX variable.  
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The dummies for the years (which are not tabu-
lated) indicate that the forecast accuracy is worst for 
the year 2002 after the stock-market bubble had 
burst and many companies reported (unexpected) 
reductions in earnings. The year with the highest  
level of forecast accuracy is 1998, which serves as a 
reference year in the analysis. For the industry 
dummies, which are also not reported in Table 7, 
forecast accuracy is significantly higher than the 
reference group for the food (SIC_20), wood 
(SIC_24), and furniture (SIC_25) industries as well  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as for merchandize stores (SIC_53) and significantly 
lower for the motion-picture industry (SIC_78). 
This is in line with the results from Hüfner and 
Möller (1997). 
The adjusted R2 is relatively high in comparison to 
other studies investigating the determinants of fi-
nancial analysts’ forecast accuracy (e.g. Daske 2005 
with adjusted R2 between 5.16% and 8.32% depend-
ing on the model). A reason might be the use of 
novel variables, like the predicted beta which – to  
 
 
Table 7: Regression results for models (1a)-(1c)  
               
          
Variable Exp. sign Model (1a)   Model (1b)   Model (1c)  
          
          
Intercept +/- -34.5303   0.9659   4.8782  
  (-5.22) ***  (0.18)   (0.94)  
IFRSt + 4.0223   4.8116   4.2926  
 (H1) (2.05) **  (2.35) ***  (2.12) ** 
USt + 10.9675   12.5291   10.1942  
 (H1) (4.37) ***  (4.69) ***  (3.83) *** 
TIMEt - -0.0073   -0.0046   -0.0031  
  (-2.89) ***  (-1.86) **  (-1.26)  
Log(MCAPt) + 5.7082        
  (9.90) ***       
COVERAGEt +    0.4667     
     (5.73) ***    
DAXt +       10.1541  
        (3.99) *** 
MDAXt +       2.8500  
        (1.90) ** 
TECDAXt +       10.0750  
        (3.12) *** 
NEW_MARKETt +       17.9628  
        (5.79) *** 
SDAXt +       -2.4246  
        (-1.14)  
BETAt - -21.6880   -22.1947   -22.1784  
  (-6.78) ***  (-6.48) ***  (-6.52) *** 
LOSSt - -22.3708   -26.7435   -27.6939  
  (-9.99) ***  (-11.20) ***  (-11.61) *** 
LOSS-1t - -1.4515   -4.7360   -5.1576  
  (-0.53)   (-1.67) **  (-1.83) ** 
US_CROSSLISTt +/- -12.4066   -4.7748   -2.2202  
  (-4.77) ***  (-1.91) *  (-0.79)  
GDPt + 1.9405   2.5819   2.5832  
  (1.30) *  (1.72) **  (1.72) ** 
Year dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
          
Observations  22,459   22,459   22,459  
Firms  591   591   591  
Adjusted R²  29.75%   26.50%   26.95%  
             
The table shows the regression results for model (1) as described in the text, i.e. the coefficients of the variables and the t-statistics  
(standard errors clustered by firm) in brackets below. For a description of the variables see Table 2. The dependent variable is the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy based on the median consensus forecasts (FA_MEDIAN). Industry dummy variables and year 
dummy variables are included in all models but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Test statistics are one-tailed if the expected sign is one-sided and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 8: Regression results for models (2a)-(2c) 
            
          
Variable Exp. sign Model (2a)   Model (2b)   Model (2c)  
          
          
Intercept +/- -32.6992   2.8239   6.3712  
  (-5.26) ***  (0.57)   (1.33)  
IFRSt + 5.7959   5.4084   4.7703  
 (H1) (2.30) **  (2.05) **  (1.77) ** 
USt + 14.0627   14.5277   11.8266  
 (H1) (4.70) ***  (4.56) ***  (3.64) *** 
ADOPTt*IFRSt*HGB-1t - -3.2187   -0.9415   -0.6201  
  (-1.37) *  (-0.38)   (-0.24)  
ADOPTt*IFRSt*US-1t +/- -0.5590   0.6564   -0.4293  
  (-0.08)   (0.10)   (-0.06)  
ADOPTt*USt*HGB-1t - -13.1639   -10.5109   -7.0910  
 (H2) (-2.77) ***  (-2.16) **  (-1.44) * 
ADOPTt*USt*IFRS-1t +/- -46.6096   -42.7594   -40.0627  
  (-1.36)   (-1.23)   (-1.15)  
ADOPT-1t*IFRSt +/- -1.9733   0.4534   0.1443  
 (H3) (-0.59)   (0.13)   (0.04)  
ADOPT-1t*USt +/- -4.5680   -1.7261   -1.4853  
 (H3) (-1.81) *  (-0.64)   (-0.56)  
TIMEt - -0.0077   -0.0048   -0.0031  
  (-3.02) ***  (-1.90) **  (-1.27)  
Log(MCAPt) + 5.8414        
  (10.07) ***       
COVERAGEt +    0.4731     
     (5.80) ***    
DAXt +       10.3845  
        (4.07) *** 
MDAXt +       2.9988  
        (1.94) ** 
TECDAXt +       9.8080  
        (2.99) *** 
NEW_MARKETt +       17.3168  
        (5.53) *** 
SDAXt +       -2.2636  
        (-1.05)  
BETAt - -22.6080   -22.7071   -22.4555  
  (-6.89) ***  (-6.47) ***  (-6.47) *** 
LOSSt - -22.3421   -26.7783   -27.6906  
  (-9.99) ***  (-11.22) ***  (-11.61) *** 
LOSS-1t - -1.3187   -4.6289   -5.0607  
  (-0.48)   (-1.64) *  (-1.80) ** 
US_CROSSLISTt +/- -12.7218   -4.8610   -2.3828  
  (-4.91) ***  (-1.93) *  (-0.84)  
GDPt + 1.7198   2.4193   2.4167  
  (1.27)   (1.78) **  (1.79) ** 
Year dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
          
Observations  22,459   22,459   22,459  
Firms  591   591   591  
Adjusted R²  30.21%   26.84%   27.21%  
           
The table shows the regression results for model (2) as described in the text, i.e. the coefficients of the variables and the t-statistics 
(standard errors clustered by firm) in brackets below. For a description of the variables see Table 2. The dependent variable is the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy based on the median consensus forecasts (FA_MEDIAN). Industry dummy variables and year 
dummy variables are included in all models but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Test statistics are one-tailed if the expected sign is one-sided and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 9: Regression results for models (2a)-(2c) using aggregated data 
            
          
Variable Exp. sign Model (2a)   Model (2b)   Model (2c)  
  aggregated   aggregated   aggregated  
          
          
Intercept +/- -23.1610   11.1178   14.1724  
  (-3.11) ***  (1.59)   (2.06) ** 
IFRSt + 7.4502   6.8605   6.3381  
 (H1) (2.64) ***  (2.30) **  (2.08) ** 
USt + 16.1983   16.5845   13.6800  
 (H1) (4.96) ***  (4.77) ***  (3.88) *** 
ADOPTt*IFRSt*HGB-1t - -4.2710   -1.9214   -1.7374  
  (-1.60) *  (-0.70)   (-0.60)  
ADOPTt*IFRSt*US-1t +/- 0.6493   1.3848   -0.0177  
  (0.10)   (0.21)   (0.00)  
ADOPTt*USt*HGB-1t - -16.4251   -13.7932   -10.0408  
 (H2) (-3.06) ***  (-2.50) ***  (-1.82) ** 
ADOPTt*USt*IFRS-1t +/- -46.3720   -42.3178   -39.2372  
  (-1.33)   (-1.21)   (-1.11)  
ADOPT-1t*IFRSt +/- -2.5044   -0.1861   -0.4530  
 (H3) (-0.77)   (-0.06)   (-0.14)  
ADOPT-1t*USt +/- -7.1962   -4.3945   -4.1854  
 (H3) (-2.45) **  (-1.41)   (-1.38)  
TIMEt - -0.0585   -0.0582   -0.0471  
  (-1.90) **  (-1.81) **  (-1.49) * 
Log(MCAPt) + 5.7674        
  (9.38) ***       
COVERAGEt +    0.5533     
     (5.86) ***    
DAXt +       11.4323  
        (3.98) *** 
MDAXt +       3.6224  
        (2.21) ** 
TECDAXt +       12.0880  
        (3.33) *** 
NEW_MARKETt +       18.1248  
        (4.93) *** 
SDAXt +       -2.6919  
        (-1.12)  
BETAt - -24.9404   -25.4776   -25.0322  
  (-6.78) ***  (-6.45) ***  (-6.30) *** 
LOSSt - -22.0877   -26.0161   -26.9576  
  (-9.91) ***  (-11.08) ***  (-11.43) *** 
LOSS-1t - -1.5068   -4.5817   -5.0928  
  (-0.54)   (-1.57) *  (-1.75) ** 
US_CROSSLISTt +/- -12.3034   -5.7817   -2.5684  
  (-4.37) ***  (-2.07) **  (-0.82)  
GDPt + 1.9811   2.8533   2.7190  
  (1.37) *  (1.93) **  (1.86) ** 
Year dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
          
Observations  2,104   2,104   2,104  
Firms  591   591   591  
Adjusted R²  31.47%   28.21%   28.47%  
           
The table shows the regression results using yearly aggregated data for model (2) as described in the text, i.e. the coefficients of 
the variables and the t-statistics (standard errors clustered by firm) in brackets below. Aggregated data are means except for the 
index dummies and US_CROSSLIST which are modes. For a description of the variables see Table 2. The dependent variable is 
the analysts’ forecast accuracy based on the median consensus forecasts (FA_MEDIAN). Industry dummy variables and year 
dummy variables are included in all models but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Test statistics are one-tailed if the expected sign is one-sided and two-tailed otherwise. 
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our knowledge – have not been included in an 
analysis before. 
Table 8 shows the regression results for model (2), 
again for three different specifications. The interac-
tion term indicating that a company that previously 
reported under German GAAP has switched to US 
GAAP (ADOPTt*USt*HGB-1t) is significant (at least 
at the 10% level) in all three specifications of model 
(2) and negatively related to forecast accuracy. The 
interaction term for a change from German GAAP 
to IFRS in the respective period (ADOPTt 
*IFRSt*HGB-1t) is only significant in specification 
(2a) at the 10% level but not in the other specifica-
tions. The other interaction terms indicating a 
change in the respective period are not significant at 
any conventional level in any specification of model 
(2). These results suggest that according to our hy-
pothesis 2 the forecast accuracy of periods in which 
a company switched from German GAAP to US 
GAAP is lower than in other years. However, we do 
not find an effect such as this for a change from 
IFRS to US GAAP or for adoptions of IFRS regard-
less of the previous accounting principles. 
Model (2) also provides evidence for the third hy-
pothesis. As can be seen from the results, the coeffi-
cients of the interactions terms ADOPT-1t*IFRSt 
und ADOPT-1t*USt indicating the year after the 
adoption of IFRS or US GAAP are not significant at 
any conventional level (with one exception for speci-
fication (2a) with a weak significance at the 10% 
level). This means that the forecast accuracy in the 
second year of applying IAS/IFRS or US GAAP is 
not significantly different to that of other periods 
(except for the periods of adoption). Consequently, 
financial analysts seem to incur difficulties in modi-
fying their prediction models in the first year of the 
application of US GAAP, but learn to cope with the 
new information basis from the second year on-
wards. The results for the control variables are very 
similar to those of the first model. 
8. Sensitivity analyses 
In the following we report results of sensitivity tests 
and robustness checks aimed at increasing the con-
fidence in our main empirical results. We first 
evaluate whether our results hold when using firm-
yearly observations instead of firm-monthly obser-
vations. Next, we examine the impact of self-
selection on our results. Finally, we explore the sen-
sitivity of the main analyses to variable specifica-
tions. Here we only report the results for models 
(2a)-(2c) as all hypotheses can be answered by 
them, and models (1a)-(1c) do not lead to different 
conclusions regarding any variable employed. 
8.1 Aggregated yearly data 
The sample of the previous analysis includes multi-
ple observations per firm year while the main vari-
ables of interest (i.e. IFRS, US, ADOPT, and 
ADOPT-1) are firm-year specific. In the following, 
we investigate whether the results also hold when 
an aggregated sample with firm-yearly observations 
instead of firm-monthly observations is used. This 
aggregated sample encompasses 2,104 firm-year 
observations. 
The results of estimating models (1) and (2) for this 
aggregated sample are qualitatively the same as in 
our main analyses shown (the results for specifica-
tions (2a)-(2c) are depicted in Table 9). The dummy 
variables IFRS and US are positive and significant at 
least at the 5% level in all models. Moreover, hy-
pothesis (2) is supported, because the interaction 
term (ADOPTt*USt*HGB-1t) has a significantly 
negative coefficient in all specifications of model (2). 
Similar to the main analysis, in specification (2a) the 
interaction term ADOPTt*IFRSt*HGB1t is signifi-
cantly negative at the 10% level. Regarding the year 
after adoption of IAAP, the interaction term 
ADOPT-1t*IFRSt is no longer significant as expected 
(hypothesis 3). However, the interaction term 
ADOPT-1t*USt in model (2a) is significantly nega-
tive at the 5% level. The coefficients of the control 
variables are very similar to those of the main analy-
ses in terms of sign and significance. 
8.2 Self-selection 
In a further sensitivity test, we examine the issue of 
self-selection. Our methodological approach in-
volves assessing the relationship of analysts’ forecast 
accuracy and the type of accounting regime applied. 
Since we are investigating voluntary or quasi-
voluntary adopters of IAS/IFRS and US GAAP the 
type of accounting principles applied are endoge-
nous choice variables. However, the exogenous 
determinants of the choice of the accounting regime 
could also affect the forecast accuracy of analysts. If 
these determinants are not (fully) included in our 
models, then the dummy variables for the type of 
accounting regime applied are correlated with the 
true (but not observed) error term which leads to a 
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correlated omitted variable problem. This so-called 
self-selection bias is addressed by other studies 
about the voluntary adoption of international ac-
counting regimes in different means. While Gassen 
and Sellhorn (2006) use a propensity score match-
ing procedure to determine a matched sample, 
other studies (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Hung and 
Subramanyam 2007) apply a two-stage model fol-
lowing Heckman (1979). In our study, we also apply 
a two-stage model where in the first stage the pro-
pensity of companies to switch to an international 
accounting regime is estimated and in the second 
stage the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), which is calcu-
lated from the results of the first stage, is included in 
our regression. 
Following the prior studies that also apply a two-
stage model, we predict that the decision of compa-
nies to adopt IAAP depends on a company’s size, 
profitability, ownership structure, capital intensity, 
leverage, degree of foreign sales, listing in the New 
Market as well as on the number of years a company 
is listed and on whether it is cross-listed or not. 
Consequently, we estimate the following probit 
model: 
 
(3)  US_IFRSi,y = 
γ0 + γ1 log(MCAPi,y) + γ2 ROAi,y + γ3 OWNi,y + γ4 CAPINTi,y  
+ γ5 LEVERAGEi,y + γ6 FOREIGNi,y + γ7 NEW_MARKETi,y  
+ γ8 Y_LISTEDi,y + γ9 US_CROSSLISTi,y + year dummies  
+ industry dummies + ηi,y, 
 
where for company i and year y US_IFRS is a 
dummy variable indicating the use of IAAP, 
log(MCAP) is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity, ROA is the return on assets, OWN is 
the percentage of closely held shares, CAPINT is the 
capital intensity (long-term assets divided by total 
assets), LEVERAGE is the leverage, FOREIGN is the 
percentage of foreign sales, NEW_MARKET is a 
dummy variable indicating if the company is listed 
at the New Market, Y_LISTED is the number of 
years a company is listed at the stock exchange, and 
US_CROSSLIST is a dummy for indicating whether 
the company is cross-listed in the US or not. All data 
for variables not previously introduced in section 
5.3 are from Datastream.  
The results from estimating this model are depicted 
in Table 10. The additional data requirements leave 
us with a reduced sample of 1,247 yearly observa-
tions (in comparison to the 2,104 observations in 
the aggregated models). The variables log(MCAP), 
ROA, OWN, CAPINT, and NEW_MARKET are 
significant (at least at the 5% level) in explaining the 
decision of companies to apply IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. The dummies for the respective years (which 
are not tabulated) are all significantly positive (at 
the 1% level). More specifically, they become gradu-
ally more and more significant over time: Taking 
1998 as a reference group, the z-statistic of 1999 is 
3.83 compared to 11.54 for 2004). The McFadden 
R2 of the model (36.58%) is considerably high in 
comparison to other studies (e.g. Leuz 2003 with 
29.3% and 7.7% for 1999 and 2000, respectively). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Regression results for the pro-
pensity of applying IAS/IFRS and US 
GAAP 
     
    
Variable Exp. sign Coefficient  
  (z-statistics)  
    
    
Intercept +/- -1.0374  
  (-1.92) * 
Log(MCAPy) + 0.0974  
  (1.82) ** 
ROAy +/- -0.0137  
  (-2.23) ** 
OWNy - -0.0069  
  (-2.11) ** 
CAPINTy - -0.0125  
  (-2.38) *** 
LEVERAGEy + -0.0031  
  (-0.64)  
FOREIGNy + 0.0039  
  (1.24)  
NEW_MARKETy + 0.9015  
  (1.70) ** 
Y_LISTEDy +/- -0.0092  
  (-0.89)  
US_CROSSLISTy + -0.1713  
  (-0.61)  
Year dummies +/- Yes  
Industry dummies +/- Yes  
    
Observations  1,247  
Firms  389  
McFadden R²  36.58%  
     
 
The table shows the regression results, i.e. the coefficients of 
the variables and the z-statistics (standard errors clustered 
by firm) in brackets below, for model (3) as described in the 
text. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
the application of an international accounting regime 
(IAS/IFRS or US GAAP). Industry dummy variables (only 
for the one-digit SIC code due to the lower number of obser-
vations) and year dummy variables are included in all 
models but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Regression results for models (2a)–(2c) including the Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
          
Variable Exp. sign Model (2a)   Model (2b)   Model (2c)  
  with IMR   with IMR   with IMR  
          
          
Intercept +/- -14.6578   10.3315   10.3905  
  (-1.50)   (1.19)   (1.17)  
IMRt +/- -0.4707   -4.7434   -3.0724  
  (-0.14)   (-1.44)   (-0.89)  
IFRSt + -0.7836   -1.6486   -0.9147  
 (H1) (-0.36)   (-0.73)   (-0.39)  
USt + 10.5468   9.1725   8.2753  
 (H1) (3.46) ***  (2.91) ***  (2.52) *** 
ADOPTt*IFRSt*HGB-1t - 2.0943   3.2586   2.5831  
  (0.92)   (1.42)   (1.05)  
ADOPTt*IFRSt*US-1t +/- 6.1046   4.0564   3.2727  
  (0.68)   (0.45)   (0.37)  
ADOPTt*USt*HGB-1t - -12.8951   -11.8634   -9.8492  
 (H2) (-1.92) **  (-1.75) **  (-1.42) * 
ADOPTt*USt*IFRS-1t +/- -63.6207   -58.9799   -56.3192  
  (-1.69) *  (-1.50)   (-1.43)  
ADOPT-1t*IFRSt +/- -1.0079   0.3252   -0.0617  
 (H3) (-0.21)   (0.06)   (-0.01)  
ADOPT-1t*USt +/- -7.0714   -5.6937   -4.6845  
 (H3) (-2.47) **  (-1.96) *  (-1.56)  
TIMEt - -0.0045   -0.0039   -0.0021  
  (-1.69) **  (-1.45) *  (-0.79)  
Log(MCAPt) + 4.1525        
  (6.39) ***       
COVERAGEt +    0.4068     
     (4.74) ***    
DAXt +       10.9229  
        (4.01) *** 
MDAXt +       3.7547  
        (1.88) ** 
TECDAXt +       9.5564  
        (2.62) *** 
NEW_MARKETt +       11.6146  
        (2.17) ** 
SDAXt +       0.8103  
        (0.37)  
BETAt - -14.3777   -16.8708   -16.8654  
  (-4.40) ***  (-4.87) ***  (-4.78) *** 
LOSSt - -24.7961   -28.0818   -28.9042  
  (-7.81) ***  (-8.41) ***  (-8.49) *** 
LOSS-1t - -1.9054   -3.8291   -4.2183  
  (-0.49)   (-0.96)   (-1.06)  
US_CROSSLISTt +/- -8.6084   -3.1902   -1.4082  
  (-2.95) ***  (-1.14)   (-0.48)  
GDPt + 0.3204   1.1839   1.0394  
  (0.18)   (0.65)   (0.56)  
Year dummies +/- Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry dummies +/- No   No   No  
          
Observations  13,611   13,611   13,611  
Firms  389   389   389  
Adjusted R²  28.48%   25.98%   25.92%  
           
 
The table shows the regression results, i.e. the coefficients of the variables and the t-statistics (standard errors clustered by firm) in 
brackets below, for model (2) as described in the text, but including the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) calculated from the probit re-
gression in Table 10. The standard errors for the t-statistics are not adjusted according to the Heckman procedure because IMR is 
not significantly different from zero in any specification (see footnote 6). For a description of the variables see Table 2. The de-
pendent variable is the analysts’ forecast accuracy based on the median consensus forecasts (FA_MEDIAN). Year dummy vari-
ables are included but not reported, industry dummies are not included due to multicollinearity. *, **, and *** indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Test statistics are one-tailed if the expected sign is one-sided and two-tailed 
otherwise. 
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In the second stage, we include the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) calculated from the results of the first 
stage in our models (1a)–(1c) and (2a)–(2c). We did 
not include industry dummies due to multicollinear-
ity. The results for models (2a)–(2c) are shown in 
Table 11. Our sample is reduced to 13,611 monthly 
observations. We test the null hypothesis of a selec-
tion bias by conducting a standard t-test on IMR. 
This is appropriate if the coefficient of IMR is zero 
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 564) as in our case.6 IMR is 
not significant at any conventional level in any of the 
models, which indicates no issue of self-selection. 
Further, the inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio 
leads to IFRS being no longer significant in all mod-
els. However, estimating all models for the reduced 
sample of 13,611 observations covering 389 firms 
(for which all data for calculating IMR are available) 
without including IMR also yields an insignificant 
coefficient for IFRS (with t-statistics between –0.65 
and –0.19 in models (1a)–(1c) and between –0.36 
and –0.18 in models (2a)–(2b) for IFRS). This indi-
cates that the result of a non-significant coefficient 
for IFRS is due to the reduction of our sample and 
not to self-selection. For financial statements under 
US GAAP the results suggest that forecast accuracy 
is clearly higher than for HGB even in this reduced 
sample and after controlling for self-selection. Basi-
cally, the coefficients for the other variables are 
qualitatively similar to those in the main analyses. 
One exception is the coefficient of the interaction 
term indicating the second year of applying US 
GAAP (ADOPT-1t*USt) which is significantly nega-
tive in specifications (2a) and (2b). 
We also tested for self-selection using aggregated 
data (see Section 8.1) and by running the regres-
sions including IMR for each of the respective years 
using model specifications (1a)–(1c). Again, we did 
not find any significance of IMR (with only one 
exception of a weak significance at the 10% level for 
specification (1b) in 1999). We therefore conclude 
that our results are not affected by self-selection. 
8.3 Further sensitivity analyses 
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the de-
pendent variable, we re-estimate all models using 
                                                             
6 As IMR is not significantly different from zero in any of our 
model specifications, we do not adjust the standard errors in 
our regressions (e.g. according to Maddala 1983, pp. 252-256), 
because an adjustment is not necessary in this case 
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 565). 
FA_MEAN based on the mean consensus forecasts 
alternatively. The inferences do not change. IFRS 
and US are significantly positive for all models with 
t-statistics between 1.70 and 2.22 for IFRS and be-
tween 3.57 and 4.61 for US GAAP for specifications 
(2a)–(2c). The interaction term indicating a switch 
from HGB to US GAAP is significantly negative 
(with t-statistics between –2.82 and –1.39). 
As consensus forecasts based on one or two esti-
mates only could be biased, we assess the impact of 
excluding observations with a number of analysts 
following smaller than three. This restricts our sam-
ple to 15,660 observations. Re-estimating both 
models for this sub-sample shows that IFRS is no 
longer or only weakly significant (with t-statistics 
for specifications (2a)–(2c) between 1.08 and 1.44), 
but the other inferences do not change. 
Finally, we also perform the tests winsorizing the 
dependent variable at –100% and not at the 99th 
percentile. We find higher adjusted R2 (between 
37.74% and 41.36% for models (1a)–(1c) and be-
tween 38.01% and 41.76% for models (2a)–(2c)). 
The coefficients in the regressions are very similar to 
those in the main analyses. 
In summary, the sensitivity analyses indicate that 
the results are not driven by the use of monthly or 
yearly data, by self-selection issues, by the type of 
dependent variable used or by the treatment of out-
liers. However, the forecast accuracy for financial 
statements under IAS/IFRS in comparison to those 
under HGB seems to be sensitive to the sample size. 
In both sensitivity analyses in which several obser-
vations are excluded (self-selection and use of ob-
servations with at least three analysts following) the 
dummy IFRS was no longer significant. The results 
for US GAAP observations are robust even when the 
sample size is reduced. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper assesses the influence of different ac-
counting principles and of a change from domestic 
to internationally accepted accounting principles on 
the financial analysts’ forecast accuracy in Germany. 
It contributes to prior research by investigating (1) 
the forecast accuracy of financial analysts based on 
data from applying different accounting principles 
and (2) the impact of a change of accounting prin-
ciples on the forecast accuracy. Our results suggest 
that the forecast accuracy is higher for estimates 
based on IAS/IFRS or US GAAP data than for fore-
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casts based on German GAAP data. Moreover, in 
years of the adoption of new accounting principles 
the forecast accuracy is lower when a company has 
switched from German GAAP to US GAAP. This 
does not hold for other types of switches (from 
German GAAP to IFRS, from US GAAP to IFRS, or 
from IFRS to US GAAP). In the year after the adop-
tion of a new accounting regime the forecast accu-
racy is no longer significantly different to other pe-
riods (except for periods of adoption). This suggests 
a learning effect of the analysts. 
The sensitivity analyses show that our results hold 
when we use yearly instead of monthly observations 
and when we control for self-selection of companies. 
When the sample is reduced due to additional data 
requirements in the sensitivity analyses, the forecast 
accuracy for IAS/IFRS observations seems to be no 
longer significantly different to that for German 
GAAP observations However, our conclusions re-
garding US GAAP are unchanged. 
Germany provides a unique framework for these 
analyses because many publicly traded German 
companies successively switched to IAAP before 
2005 and the national GAAP is significantly differ-
ent to IAS/IFRS and US GAAP. These facts allow us 
to examine the influences of the type of accounting 
principles applied and of a change of the accounting 
principles besides other control variables used in 
previous studies on analysts’ forecast accuracy in a 
homogenous institutional context. Furthermore, it 
enables us to control for macroeconomic and other 
variables that could change over time. The German 
experience, especially in shifting to IAS/IFRS, pro-
vides useful insights in what we could expect for 
publicly traded companies in other European coun-
tries, which changed to IFRS in 2005. 
There are several limitations of this study: First, as 
forecast accuracy of financial analysts is influenced 
by many factors, low forecast errors do not neces-
sarily translate to high accounting quality and our 
results do not necessarily imply that accounting 
information from IAAP is more useful to financial 
analysts. For example, the assumption that financial 
analysts have an incentive to provide accurate fore-
casts could be violated for our sample. If the incen-
tives differ between analysts providing estimates for 
IAAP companies and other analysts providing esti-
mates for German GAAP companies, our results 
could be (partly) due to the incentives and not to the 
different properties of the accounting regimes. Sec-
ond, we focus on Germany only. Therefore, the find-
ings of the paper may not be generalized to other 
countries. Third, we do not disentangle the reasons 
for the higher forecast accuracy of IAS/IFRS- and 
US GAAP-based forecasts in comparison to German 
GAAP-based forecasts. Thus, further research is 
needed to examine whether additional disclosures 
or properties of the recognition or measurement 
rules between the accounting regimes, analysts’ 
abilities of interpreting financial statements under 
IAAP, or different manager-driven influences in 
terms of earnings management or expectations 
management are the decisive factors. Finally, the 
sample period is 1998–2004. In this period, the 
adoption of IAS/IFRS or US GAAP was – except for 
requirements of certain stock segments a company 
seeks to be included, e.g. the new market – volun-
tary. The mandatory adoption of IFRS since 2005 
might have different effects on forecast accuracy. 
Moreover, the accuracy of IFRS-based forecasts for 
the period after 2004 might have changed as impor-
tant standards of the IFRS were revised (e.g. im-
pairment-only approach for goodwill) and a new 
enforcement system was established in Germany. 
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